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Tangled in the Web: Federal and State
Efforts to Protect Children from
Internet Pornography
by Jennifer A. Rupert
I. INTRODUCTION
The information available on the Internet
'is as diverse as human thought.'1
It is no exaggeration to conclude
that the content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought. Every
aspect of science, technology, medicine,
news, and the arts can be found on the
Internet. And, in cyberspace, a speaker
needs only a computer and a modem
to reach a potential audience of
millions. But this revolutionary
instrument of free expression has come
with a cost. Technology has provided
computer users with new ways to
commit old crimes. Child
pornography thrives within the
anonymous and unrestrained
environment of the Internet.
Pedophiles no longer need to lurk
about playgrounds and malls but can
lure children from the safety of their
own living rooms.
Federal and state lawmakers have
responded by passing a myriad of bills
to curb Internet pornography.2 The
most controversial efforts have focused
on shielding children from harmful
online materials. When challenged on
constitutional grounds, however, these
measures have a dismal track record.3
In many cases, the debate has pitted
the constitutional right of free speech
against society's worthy goal of
protecting its children.
This Article proposes that the
Internet should be governed by market
forces. Unless lawmakers' grasp of the
Internet can keep pace with its rapid
evolution, any censorship measures are
likely to be both ineffective and
unconstitutional. Part II begins by
tracing the Internet's development,
which illustrates why the Internet
defies authority, describes the growing
awareness of pornography on the
Internet, and the legislative rush to
control it. Part II discusses the
traditional judicial approach to
pornography and why it may not
readily translate to cyberspace. Part IV
demonstrates why states should stay
out of the business of Internet
regulation altogether, discusses the
weaknesses of the most recent federal
regulation, and reviews viable non-
legislative solutions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Internet is the "closest thing to
true anarchy that has ever existed" 4
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The Internet is a network of
interconnected computers that
stretches across the world. The
Internet has no borders - computers
of all shapes and sizes communicate
with one other as if they were a single
computer. No one government or
organization has authority over the
entire Internet. It cannot be turned on
or off. No one owns it and everyone
owns it.
The Internet was created by
researchers, students, and computer
engineers - "people who lived and
breathed the hacker ethic."5 The
original rules of 'netiquette' were set
by hackers. "Access to computers
should be unlimited and total. All
information should be free. Mistrust
authority and promote
decentralization." 6
Ironically, this unruly creature was
born of the Department of Defense.7
The roots of the Internet can be traced
back to the 1957 launch of the Soviet
satellite Sputnik. Distraught about the
Soviet victory, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower established several
research centers to boost the U.S. space
program and establish the lead in
science and military technology.8 In
1969, one of these centers created
ARPANet9 - the forerunner of today's
Internet. 10
ARPANet's mission was to link by
computer scientific laboratories across
the nation." It is commonly believed
that the network's purpose was to
ensure that communication lines
remain open in the event of nudear
war.' But ARPANet founder Bob
Taylor daims the real aim was to
enable researchers to share computer
resources. 3 For the next 20 years,
ARPANet remained the private
domain of scientists, engineers, and
administrators. 4
In 1985, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) scattered five
supercomputer centers about the
country. 5 The interconnected NSF
supercomputers ultimately formed the
"backbone" of the Internet. Upon NSF
invitation, a number of U.S.
universities and colleges created their
own networks and linked up.
Eventually, ARPANet gave way to the
more robust NSFNet and the modern
day Internet emerged.16
In 1991, CERN released the World
Wide Web. 7 The Web was
excruciatingly difficult to use until
some University of Illinois students,
led by Marc Andreessen, created the
first Web browser, Mosaic. 8 By 1993,
over one million people around the
world were using Mosaic to "surf the
net." 9 At about the same time, the
NSF lifted its ban on commercial and
personal activity on the Internet.20
Providing connections to the Internet
became profitable business and online
service providers (ISPs) added
members so rapidly they risked
exceeding their capacity.2'
Finally, Internet users no longer
needed access through a university or
government research lab and expertise
in the Unix operating system.22 With as
little as a computer and a modem,
Internet users could reach a potential
audience of millions. Even the most
inexperienced users could mouse-click
their way to an astounding array of
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information, products, and services.23
The free-market system finally wrested
the Internet away from the hackers and
computer scientists.
B. "The Web is awash in degrading
smut"24
1995 was a pivotal year of discovery
in cyberspace. At least sixty-five
million users discovered that
navigating the Internet could be simple
with the Web browser Netscape. 25 For
the first time, soldiers on the front used
the Internet to chat with their families
back home.26 The government learned
that domain name registration fees
could be a lucrative source of income.27
The Vatican went on-line.28 And
Congress discovered pornography on
the Internet.29
Of course, online pornography was
not exactly fresh news to hackers. In
1993, the U.S. Customs Service carried
out the first ever crackdown on an
Internet child pornography ring.30 The
ring, based in Denmark, operated a
computer bulletin board which
charged its members a yearly fee to
access and download sexually explicit
photographs of children. Several
members were U.S. citizens. In
addition, pedophiles were using email
to exchange sexually explicit photos of
children as well as turning to Usenet
newsgroups for support and
encouragement. 31 Two years later,
Operation Innocent Images was
launched when the FBI searched more
than 120 homes and arrested twelve
people for using America Online to
post pornographic pictures of children
and to arrange for sex with children.32
Also in 1995, Carnegie Mellon
researcher Marty Rimm released an
explosive report on online
pornography. Although the report was
later discredited, it quite effectively
raised public awareness concerning
cyberspace's pornographic
underworld.33 The report stated that
83.5% of all images stored in
newsgroups were pornographic.34 In
addition, the report professed that the
distribution and consumption of
sexually explicit pictures was "one of
the largest (if not the largest)
recreational applications of users of
computer networks."31
C. Lawmakers struggle to
differentiate a "a gigabyte from
a chigger bite"3
1. Federal Legislation
So it was not surprising that
legislators felt a certain urgency to
eradicate online pornography.
Activists were having scant success
with their 'YOU WILL ALL BURN IN
HELL!' bulletin board messages.37
Congress' solution was the
Communications Decency Act (CDA).3
In its final form, the CDA proposed to
make it criminal to transmit obscene or
indecent messages to a person the
sender knows is under eighteen years
of age or use an interactive computer
service to send or display patently
offensive messages in a manner that will
make them available to persons under
eighteen years of age.39
From the start, numerous
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lawmakers and scholars doubted the
CDA would survive under the First
Amendment. Speaker Newt Gingrich
called the CDA "dearly a violation of
free speech" 4° and one civil libertarian
worried that the CDA would
"transform the vast library of the
Internet into a children's reading
room."41 The Justice Department
stated the measure was unnecessary
because existing laws covered the
transmission of obscenity and child
pornography.42 The biggest blow to the
CDA came within the chambers of
Congress itself where members from
both sides of the aisle joined forces to
advocate a free market solution.43
Then, in mid-1995, Senator Exon
produced his "blue book" - a folder
crammed with the most raunchy
cyberspace images he and a friend
could find." After the Senator invited
his colleagues into the cloakroom for a
private showing, the Senate passed the
bill 84 to 16. 41 Discussion in the House
was far less tempestuous than it had
been in the Senate. 6 After brief debate,
the House approved the bill and
presented the CDA to the President for
final enactment.
The CDA was actually Title V of the
broader Telecommunications Act of
1996.'7 The avowed purpose of the
Telecom Act was to "reduce regulation
and encourage 'the rapid deployment
of new telecommunications
technologies.' ' 4 Ironically, while the
Telecom Act loosened the reins on the
telecom industry, the CDA exposed
cyberspace to the federal government's
first ever attempt at Internet
censorship.
When Bill Clinton signed the CDA
into law on February 8, 1996, the
ACLU and nineteen other plaintiffs
were poised and ready to file a
challenge in federal district court.49
Within just seventeen months, Reno v.
ACLU (Reno I) had found its way to the
U.S. Supreme Court where the CDA
was struck down on First Amendment
grounds.50
By 1998, Congress passed its second
effort to protect children from
pornography in cyberspace. In
October of that year, the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA) was dispatched
to the President bearing the
imprimatur of the Omnibus
Appropriations Bill.5 Essentially,
COPA required commercial Web site
operators to block minors from
accessing material deemed "harmful to
minors" or face criminal prosecution.12
Congress's goal was to require
commercial pornographers "'to put
sexually explicit messages 'behind the
counter' on the Web,' similar to
existing requirements in some states
that such material to be held behind a
counter or sold in a paper wrapper in a
physical store."5 3
Although Congress had intended
COPA to cure the CDA of its
constitutional afflictions, the bill
quickly became know as "CDA II,"
"Son of CDA," or the more
acrimonious "Spawn of CDA."M
Within two days of the bill's
enactment, several plaintiffs had filed
suit with the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. ss
Within weeks, in ACLU v. Reno (Reno
II), Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr. entered a
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temporary restraining order enjoining
the enforcement of the law. On
February 1, 1999, plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction was granted.
The fate of COPA currently awaits trial.
2. State Legislation
While the federal government was
battling Internet pornography on the
national level, state legislatures were
poking around for their own
regulatory opportunities. By the time
the CDA was passed in 1996, at least
five states had passed laws to protect
minors from cybersmut. 6 State
lawmakers continued to pass bills even
after the CDA was struck down.
Overall since 1995, at least thirteen
states have passed Internet censorship
measures and several more states have
bills pending.57 State measures,
however, have enjoyed little success.
For example, both challenges to state
CDA-style laws in New York and New
Mexico have been sustained on
constitutional grounds." Significantly,
the New York challenge, which was
sustained on Commerce Clause
grounds, provided a framework which,
if adopted by other states, would bar
all state regulation of the Internet.
The failure of Internet legislation
has been attributed to many causes.
One commentator called the CDA "a
cheap political maneuver in an election
year." 9 It is more likely that, until
well-meaning legislators sufficiently
understand the medium they are
trying to restrain, future efforts may
also fail. (At one point, Georgia
attempted to outlaw online pictures of
marijuana.6) It is also possible that the
Internet may require an entirely new
approach to legal issues.
III. SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE ON OBSCENITY
AND ITS TRANSITION TO
CYBERSPACE
The First Amendment safeguards
our right to free speech - even in
cyberspace. The right to obscene speech,
however, is not constitutionally
protected. In a 1942 decision, the
Supreme Court only hinted that certain
categories of speech do not enjoy First
Amendment protection - among these
was obscenity.61 Finally, in 1957, the
Court held for the first time in Roth v.
United States that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press."62 As a
result, state and federal governments
are free to legislate against obscenity.63
Furthermore, under Ginsberg v. New
York, legislators may ban sexually
explicit material that is not obscene by
adult standards but would be harmful
to children.64 This additional latitude is
rooted in the belief that the State has an
interest in protecting the welfare of
children and to keep them safe from
abuses "which might prevent their
'growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens.'" 65
A. "There are as many different
definitions of obscenity as there are
men; and they are as unique to the
individual as are his dreams"66
Since Roth, legislators and courts
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have been grappling with the
definition of "obscenity." In Roth, the
Court defined obscenity as "material
which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest" 67 while
"prurient" was characterized as
"material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts." 68 Despite this
definitional guidance, the Court was
concerned that sex be distinguished
from obscenity. It stressed that the
legitimate "portrayal of sex ... in art,
literature and scientific works" should
remain under the First Amendment's
protective umbrella.69
The Roth standard provided very
little practical guidance and, for the
next sixteen years, no majority of the
Court was able to agree on a single
standard for obscenity.70 Due to the
absence of a majority view, each justice
routinely applied his own separate
test.7' Therefore, the Court's ruling in a
given case necessarily turned on
whether a majority had found the
materials in question to be obscene.72
In fact, it was during that period that
Justice Stewart commended the
following statement to quotable
history: "I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [of hard-core
pornography]; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it. . . ."73 This
uncertainty placed a strain on state and
federal courts and left prosecutors and
potential defendants with little
guidance as to what speech could be
deemed criminal.74
In the meantime, the Supreme
Court held in Ginsberg v. New York that
the government may ban the
distribution of sexually explicit
materials to children even though
those materials would not be obscene if
distributed to adults.75 That case
involved a New York law that
prohibited the sale to minors of
magazines that were deemed "harmful
to minors."76 Under Ginsberg, States
are constitutionally free to adapt the
adult obscenity definition to reflect a
more restrictive standard for minors.77
Finally, in 1973 in Miller v.
California, five Justices adopted a more
specific definition of obscenity.
Because Ginsberg pre-dated Miller,
many states eventually adopted the
original Ginsberg criteria then altered it
to reflect the more recent Miller
standard.78 The Miller three-pronged
test is still in effect today:
(a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary
community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient
interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state
law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific
value.79
Although Miller supplied a
somewhat more precise definition of
obscenity, the test's application of
community standards can be
problematic. The Miller definition
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employs a national standard to
determine what material has "serious
value" but utilizes community
standards to ascertain what appeals to
the "prurient interest" or is "patently
offensive." 80
The community standards
approach can result in uneven
prosecution. Specifically, community
standards may not be consistent from
place to place causing a work to be
protected in one community but
prosecuted in another.81 Furthermore,
juries within the same community may
not apply the test in a uniform
manner.82 One jury may brand a work
as obscene while another jury may
sustain a comparable work.
The Supreme Court, however, did
not view these shortcomings as
presenting a constitutional problem.13
The Court stated that juries must
determine as questions of fact whether
certain materials appeal to the
"prurient interest" or are "patently
offensive." It would be unrealistic to
expect all fifty states to agree upon one
single formulation for what is obscene
and then require juries to make a
determination based upon "some
abstract formulation." 84 By drawing
upon the standards of their own
communities, the people of Mississippi
and Maine are not required to tolerate
sexually explicit materials simply
because those materials are acceptable
to people in Las Vegas or New York
City.5
B. "Any test that turns on what is
offensive to the community's
standards is too loose, too capricious,
too destructive of freedom of
expression to be squared with the
First Amendment"16
While the impact of community
standards has resulted in uncertainty
within traditional legal settings, the
approach is even more troubling in the
context of cyberspace. Vendors of
newspapers, movies, and television
broadcasts can direct the physical
distribution of their product.
Conversely, once a speaker posts
content on the Internet, it is impossible
to prevent that content from entering
any community.8 7 Even a user who
sends an email to a specific address has
no guarantee the email will not be
routed through any number of
communities.8 "Owners" of Internet
resources rarely have any idea where
their users are located or the age of
their users. There is no effective and
reliable way to screen users based on
their age.89 As a result, an Internet user
could potentially be hailed into any
court in the country for violating local
community standards.
In addition, community standards
cannot reach material originating
outside of the United States. A large
amount of material on the Internet
comes from international sources and
at least some of that material is
pornographic. 9° There is no
technologically feasible way of
blocking out transmissions from other
countries. 91 A user in Tennessee can
receive email from Amsterdam or
access a Web site in Paris as
transparently as if both resources were
located in California. Unlike a content
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provider in California, the users in
Amsterdam and Paris cannot be
prosecuted under United States law.92
Also unsettling is the potential that
Internet speakers will themselves
suppress constitutionally protected
speech because they fear that just one
community might find the speech
objectionable. The effect of this
"lowest common denominator"
approach is to allow the most sensitive
United States community to set the
standard for the rest of the country.93
For example, if the Chicago Museum of
Contemporary Art were to post nude
works by photographer Robert
Mapplethorpe, those photos would be
accessible to the entire Internet
community. If Cincinnati, Washington,
D.C., or any other U.S. community
found the images objectionable, the
Museum could be criminally liable
unless it deleted the photos
altogether.94
Commentators have urged that
community standards be abandoned,
at least in the context of the Internet.95
In the CDA challenge, the Court itself
stated that application of community
standards to the Internet would mean
"that any communication available to a
nationwide audience [would] be
judged by the standards of the
community most likely to be offended.
..."I9 This would essentially, "reduce
the adult population... to... only
what is fit for children."97
Despite the Court's
acknowledgements, the prospects for a
new standard are unclear. The Court
has repeatedly rejected a national
standard and has even refused the
notion of a statewide standard.98 In
fact, when ruling on the CDA, the
Court retained the original Miller test
with community standards intact.
There is also some question as to what
the appropriate community would be.
Some have concluded that the
appropriate community standard on
the Internet is the community of
cyberspace 99 but opponents of a global
standard equate it with having no
standard at all.1°°
C. "[Mluch of the legal analysis of
Intemet-related issues has focused on
seeking a familiar analogy for the
unfamiliar"101
By way of analogy, judges and
legislators are seeking to harmonize
the Internet with some line of existing
First Amendment jurisprudence. 10 2 In
First Amendment issues, a court's
choice of analogy is quite significant
because "free speech rights vary with
the technological medium through
which the speech is expressed." 10 - For
example, the broadcast industry has
historically received the most limited
First Amendment protection'04 while
print media has received the greatest
deference. 105
In its first look at Internet
indecency, the Court did not
conclusively liken the Internet to an
existing technology but it did allow
some basis of comparison based on the
medum's 'invasiveness." 6
Specifically, radio and television
communications "invade" the home
and objectionable messages can surface
completely unbidden. Conversely, to
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retrieve sexually explicit material, an
Internet user must take "a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and
directed than merely turning a dial."1°7
As a result, the Court declined to treat
the Internet as a broadcast medium.10 8
Conversely, the Court compared the
Internet to a "dial-a-porn" telephone
service where a user must also take
affirmative steps to receive a
pornographic message. The Court
based its reasoning on lower court
findings that "[allmost all sexually
explicit images are preceded by
warnings as to content" and, therefore,
'odds are slim' that a user would come
across sexually explicit material by
accident. °9 In the end, however, the
Court stated that its cases "provide no
basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to [the Internet]."" 0
The phone analogy is faulty
because a phone company is under the
power of a primary authority while the
Internet is a global medium with no
central command post. The Reno I
"affirmative steps" reasoning also is
flawed because Internet users can and
do accidentally encounter sexually
explicit material."' Children may
retrieve sexually explicit material by
innocently searching for information
on toys, dollhouses, cheerleaders, or
beanie babies. In addition, many hard-
core pornography sites use copycat
Web addresses to capitalize on
innocent mistakes. For instance, a user
who accidentally types
"www.whitehouse.com" rather than
"www.whitehouse.gov" will be
greeted with sexually explicit photos
instead of the anticipated White House
Web page. Furthermore, while many
Internet pornographers may display
warnings on their home pages, the
home pages themselves may contain
sexually explicit images called
"teasers."
Nevertheless, the Court
characterized the CDA as a content-
based restriction on speech and
subjected it to "the most stringent
review of its provisions.""' Under
strict scrutiny, the CDA would not
survive "if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that
the statute was enacted to serve."" 3 In
Reno II, the district court also applied a
strict scrutiny standard to COPA but
noted in its findings of fact that the
Internet is unlike newspapers,
broadcast media, and cable television
because it "gives a potential speaker a
worldwide audience."" 4
It is not entirely clear from Reno I
whether the Court's adoption of strict
scrutiny was based on direct analogy
or by rule. Certainly, authority
supports the conclusion that strict
scrutiny is the new standard for
indecency on the medium of the
Internet." 5 Free speech advocates may
rejoice that, due to the unique nature of
the Internet, Internet censorship laws
are simply not likely to pass strict
scrutiny."6 But, as Justice Souter
cautioned in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, the premature adoption of a
definite standard for a new technology
may harm both First Amendment
standards and technological
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On the other hand, the Court's
circuitous reasoning allows for the
possibility that the standard was
actually adopted by analogy. Such a
case by case approach may effect the
same sort of confusion that predated
Miller. However, under Justice
Souter's logic, it would give the Court
flexibility to
recogniz[e] established First
Amendment interests through a
dose analysis that constrains the
Congress, without wholly
incapacitating it... maintaining
the high value of open
communication, measuring the
costs of regulation by exact
attention to fact, and compiling a
pedigree of experience with the
changing subject. These are
familiar judicial responsibilities in
times when we know too little to
risk the finality of precision, and
attention to them will probably
take us through the
communications revolution."8
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE
EFFORTS END IN TEARS
A. The Internet "must be marked off
as a national preserve"" 9
The Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York adopted
an entirely different sort of analogy in
ALA v. Pataki (Pataki) 2° In that case,
the district court analogized the
Internet to a highway or railroad -
traditional instruments of interstate
commerce.12 ' The Court proceeded to
find the law unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause'2 and enjoined the
law's enforcement. The true
significance of the holding, however,
was that it provided the legal
framework to predude all state
regulation of the Internet.
In the spring of 1995, a 51-year-old
Seattle man flew to New York to meet
with a 14-year-old girl he had been
seducing over the Intemet. 23 But
when the two bumped into the girl's
mother at a local shopping mall, Alan
Paul Barlow found himself charged
with a misdemeanor for sending
sexually explicit photos of himself to
teenagers. Along with other similar
incidents, the Barlow case prompted
New York State Senator William Sears
to propose a law making it a felony to
transmit indecent materials to minors.
The New York act essentially made
it a crime to, knowing the character of
material, transmit material to minors
which is deemed harmful to minors.24
The State insisted the act was aimed
exclusively at intrastate conduct. 2' The
district court squarely rejected New
York's argument. 26 First, the text of the
statute itself does not in any way
restrict the prohibited conduct to New
York. Second, the act's legislative
history confirms that the bill's sponsor
was extremely concerned about "long-
distance, high-tech sexual abuse." In
fact, the bill was partially motivated by
the interstate seduction of a New York
girl by a Seattle man. Finally and most
significantly, the act cannot be "limited
to purely intrastate communications
over the Internet because no such
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communications exist." No facet of the
Internet can feasibly be sealed off from
users from another state. The "owner"
of a Web page in California cannot
prevent users in New York from
accessing that Web page. A New
Yorker sending an email to another
New Yorker has no guarantee the email
will not be routed through Ohio or any
other state.
The State also argued that the act
was not eligible for Commerce Clause
analysis because the Internet is
primarily a non-commercial means of
communication. 127 While all parties
agreed that the majority of Internet
transactions are non-profit, the
Supreme Court has held that the
Commerce Clause "is applicable to
activities undertaken without a profit
motive."' 28 Furthermore, even
noncommercial users participate in
commerce by paying monthly fees to
access the Internet. And, the Internet is
not just a means of communication - it
is also a conduit for transporting goods
such as software, data, music, and
videos, which can be downloaded to a
user's computer.
Having established the Internet as
an instrument of interstate commerce,
the court then performed three distinct
modes of Commerce Clause analysis to
formulate and then reinforce its
holding. The court first concluded the
law was a per se violation of the
Commerce Clause because it projected
New York law onto conduct that may
occur entirely outside of New York.'
For example, an artist living in
California may post artworks purely
for the pleasure of other Californians.
If the images are acceptable under
California law but illegal under the
New York act, the artist would face
prosecution in New York. This
effectively subordinates California's
policy of free expression to New York's
more protective stance.
The court also held that, even if the
act was not a direct violation of the
Commerce Clause, it would be an
indirect violation.3° While protecting
children against harmful materials is a
worthwhile goal, the court found that
the law burdened interstate commerce
far more than it benefited the local
community. Indeed, the act's
enumerated benefits hardly seemed
like benefits at all. Because New York
already has laws to protect children
against obscenity and child
pornography, the new regulation
would benefit a very narrow class of
cases. For instance, an investigator
with the Attorney General's office
identified only two instances where
distributions of child pornography
over the Internet were not also covered
by existing laws. The court also noted
the practical difficulty for New York
bounty hunters to drag to New York
pedophiles from the other 49 states.
Finally, despite the State's assertion
that a small percentage of Internet
speech would be affected, the court
found that fear of prosecution would
drive away users engaged in legitimate
communications. Museums or
libraries that post nude works by
Boticelli, Manet, Matisse, or Cezanne
might be subject to prosecution. And
lesser known artists would be at
greater risk.
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In its final mode of Commerce
Clause analysis, the court stressed that
effective regulation of the Internet
demands national, and quite possibly
global, cooperation.13 1 The court
posited that "[r]egulation by any single
state can only result in chaos, because
at least some states will likely enact
laws subjecting Internet users to
conflicting obligations and ... [and]
inconsistent regulatory schemes could
paralyze the development of the
Internet altogether."13 2 Moreover, even
if all fifty states enacted the same exact
law, Internet users would still have
inconsistent legal obligations under the
community standards approach. By
way of illustration, the play Angels in
America, which involves
homosexuality and AIDS and includes
graphic language, was acclaimed by
New Yorkers but caused public outrage
in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Ultimately, the court set aside the
Internet as a "national preserve" to be
regulated by only Congress.'13 The
impact of the Pataki decision is much
broader than its specific invalidation of
the New York law. The court's
reasoning also provides a framework,
which, if adopted by other states,
would bar all state regulation of the
Internet. In recent months, New
Mexico, following New York's lead,
has enjoined enforcement of its own
CDA-style law.'M
B. Spawn of CDA: The district court
rules on COPA's chance of survival
The CDA, Congress's first effort to
regulate content on the Internet, was
struck down in Reno I by the Supreme
Court in June 1997.135 COPA, 136
Congress's second effort, represents an
attempt to shape the CDA into a
constitutionally valid law. When COPA
was passed, the bill's sponsor stated,
"[w]e've gone a long way in providing
for a vehide that I think ultimately will
be held constitutional.... But it's
difficult to predict what the courts will
do." 37 Indeed, COPA should have
become effective on November 29, 1998
but was stopped before it could take
effect.13 On February 1, 1999, the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
preliminarily enjoined COPA from
enforcement on constitutional grounds.
COPA currently awaits a trial on the
merits.
Following Reno I, COPA must
constitute the least restrictive means to
protect children from harmful
materials and must be narrowly
tailored to that objective. 39 Despite the
obvious predictive value of the Court's
CDA ruling, technology is evolving so
rapidly that the final word on the CDA
yesterday may not be reasonable for
COPA tomorrow. As noted by Justice
Souter in Denver Area, "changes in...
regulated technologies will
enormously alter the structure of
regulation itself."140 Even if Congress
sufficiently tailored COPA to discharge
the CDA's deficiencies, Internet
regulations are not likely to keep pace
with the market's steady offering of
technology-driven solutions.
1. COPA has not healed the CDA's
vagueness problem
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The Court in Reno I declined to rule
on plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim
but nevertheless concluded the CDA's
vagueness renders it problematic for
First Amendment purposes.14'
Specifically, the vague language of the
content-based CDA coupled with the
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions
would clearly have a chilling effect on
free speech. Moreover, the CDA's
ambiguous terms make it unlikely the
statute was carefully tailored to the
goal of protecting minors from harmful
materials.
Two CDA provisions were at issue
in Reno I. The "indecent transmission"
provision made it a crime for anyone to
transmit obscene or indecent messages
to a person the sender knows is under
eighteen years of age.142 The "patently
offensive display" provision made it a
crime for anyone to use an interactive
computer service to send or display
patently offensive messages in a manner
that will make them available to
persons under eighteen years of age.' 43
Essentially, the first provision was
triggered when the sender knew the
recipient was a minor while the second
provision kicked in when the sender
simply knew his message would be
available to a minor.
When a statute regulates speech
based upon its content, the First
Amendment requires that the language
of the law be drafted with sufficient
precision to ensure that it does not
silence legitimate speech.'" But, rather
than utilizing a single linguistic form,
the CDA employed the distinct terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive." 14
The statute also failed to define either
term. As a result, the public would be
uncertain about "how the standards
relate to each other and just what they
mean."' 46 For instance, could a
computer user have serious online
discussions, without fear of
repercussions under the CDA, about
birth control practices, homosexuality,
or the consequences of prison rape?
Interestingly, the government
argued that the CDA was no more
vague than the Miller obscenity test,
which also contains a "patently
offensive" standard.147 The Court
squarely rejected the government's
contention. In order to reduce the
ambiguity of the "patently offensive"
standard, the Miller test explicitly
requires that the objectionable material
be "specifically defined by the
applicable state law."' 48 The CDA
failed to do so. Furthermore, to further
reduce the sweep of the obscenity
definition, Miller mandates application
of all three prongs. The CDA set forth
only a portion of the second "patently
offensive" prong. The third "serious
value" prong is particularly important
because, by setting a "national floor for
socially redeeming value," it helps
ensure that valid speech will not be
prohibited. 49
In response to the Court's charge of
vagueness, the drafters of COPA
replaced the "indecent" and "patently
offensive" standards with a single
"harmful to minors" standard.' 5°
Specifically, COPA makes it a crime to
use the Web for commercial purposes
to knowingly communicate to minors
material that is deemed "harmful to
minors." Many existing state laws
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employ the standard to prohibit
bookstores from displaying to minors
certain materials deemed harmful to
them.'5 ' The Justice Department,
however, has questioned whether the
"harmful to minors" standard can be
effectively translated from the
bookstore context to the Internet.'"" It
is much easier for the proprietor of a
bookstore to separate minors from
adults than for the Internet to do the
same.
According to the House Commerce
Committee, COPA's "harmful to
minors" definition conforms to the
language of the Miller obscenity
definition as applied to minors.'- 3 The
lawmakers also contend that COPA's
"harmful to minors" standard mirrors
the standards of many State laws
already successfully in place. Unlike
the CDA, COPA provides an explicit
definition of "harmful to minors." The
Justice Department counters that the
COPA definition does not absolutely
parallel the state definitions.'- 4 Similar
to many state definitions, the first
prong of the COPA definition asks
whether material would appeal to the
prurient interest of minors. Unlike
those definitions, COPA also asks
whether the material "is designed to
pander to" the prurient interest of
minors. It is unclear whether the
"panders to" language is designed to
assail the actual effect of such material
or just its intended effect.
Furthermore, according to Senator
Patrick Leahy, COPA would impose
stronger restrictions on the Web than
most states currently impose on
bookstores, newsstands and movie
theaters.' - COPA prohibits materials
harmful to children under seventeen
years of age but most state statutes
utilize an eighteen year old age cutoff.
Under COPA, Web operators must
conform their material to what is
acceptable to sixteen-year-olds rather
to seventeen-year-olds.
2. Like its predecessor, COPA is likely
to unconstitutionally restrict
protected speech
The Court in Reno I also found the
CDA to be impermissibly overbroad
because, in order to protect minors
from potentially harmful material on
the Internet, the CDA restricted a large
amount of constitutionally protected
adult speech.'- 6 For example, the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive"
could easily pertain to non-
pornographic material having
significant educational value, such as
prison rape, safe sexual practices,
artistic nude images, and perhaps even
"the card catalogue of the Carnegie
Library."5 7 In the words of the Court,
"[the breadth of the CDA's coverage
[was] wholly unprecedented."'-s
Given the technology available at
the time of trial, the district court in
Reno I concluded there was no way to
prevent minors from accessing harmful
materials without also denying access
to adults.5 9 The district court's
conclusion was based on both
technological and economic
limitations. Some commercial Web site
operators were employing age
verification techniques under which
Web site operators require users to
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enter an adult password or credit card
number to gain access to their sites.16
The district court found, however, that
those techniques were prohibitively
expensive for non-commercial and
even some commercial Web site
operators. 6' Credit card verification,
which uses a credit card as a surrogate
for proof of age, would be so expensive
that many non-commercial Web sites
would be required to shut down.1 62
Furthermore, existing technology did
not provide effective screening
mechanisms within non-Web based
protocols such as email, chat rooms, or
newsgroups. 63
The court in Reno II concluded that
plaintiffs are likely to establish that
COPA, like the CDA, imposes an
unconstitutional burden on protected
speech. 64 While most of the evidence
presented in Reno II focused on the cost
of implementing an age verification
scheme, the district court stressed that
the relevant inquiry should determine
COPA's burden on protected speech -
not on the costs of compliance. 6
Economic impediments and burdens
on speech are necessarily intertwined,
however, in the context of the Internet.
For example, according to the district
court, plaintiffs are likely to establish
that the cost of age verification systems
may drive some Web providers to self-
censorship. In addition, the extra time
and effort required to pass through
several age verification screens may
chase away users of all ages and cause
some Web sites to go out of business.
Finally, because non-Web protocols
such as chat rooms and newsgroups
can now be accessed directly from Web
sites, COPA necessarily restricts access
to those protocols as well.
3. CDA-style affirmative defenses may
not cure COPA's constitutional ills.
The CDA provided two affirmative
defenses to ease the burden on adult
speech but the Court dismissed their
effectiveness. 66 A speaker could avoid
liability either by making a "good faith,
reasonable, effective and appropriate"
effort to restrict access by minors or by
using an age verification mechanism to
restrict access to objectionable
materials.67 The Court acknowledged
that the many commercial
pornographers already using such
techniques would be protected by the
defense. 68 But the Court also criticized
the government for failing to show that
existing methods would prevent
minors from posing as adults. As a
result, the Court believed that Internet
speakers might refuse to embrace an
uncertain technology in order to save
themselves from criminal liability.
COPA provides affirmative
defenses that are substantially the same
as the CDA defenses. 69 The district
court in Reno II noted similar
weaknesses as well. 7° COPA's drafters
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
statement in Reno I that commercial
pornographers were protected by the
age verification affirmative defense.'7'
They then effectively sidestepped the
Internet's technological limitations by
restricting the statute's scope to
commercial providers on the World
Wide Web. Unfortunately, the drafter's
conveniently ignored the remainder of
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the Court's analysis which rejected the
affirmative defenses as inadequate.
There are reasons why credit card
verification systems in particular are
not a panacea for COPA's defects. If
certain adult users do not possess
credit cards, they would be prevented
from accessing a critical source of
information on the Web. For example,
one plaintiff, the publisher of
obgyn.net an internationally-known
online medical resource, laments that
medical professionals located in
countries such as Namibia and El
Salvador do not have credit cards.172
Even users possessing credit cards may
be hesitant to provide a credit card
number to a Web site unless making a
purchase. 73 As a result, credit card
verification may only be feasible for
commercial transactions.
4. Restriction to commercial
transactions renders COPA ineffective
In Reno I, the Supreme Court
criticized the CDA for its breadth
regarding commercial and non-
commercial transactions. 74 The Court
stated that "the scope of the CDA is not
limited to commercial speech or
commercial entities. Its open-ended
prohibitions embrace all non-profit
entities and individuals posting
indecent messages or displaying them
on their own computers in the presence
of minors." 171
COPA's drafters claim that, because
the measure is limited to commercial
transactions on the World Wide Web,
any concerns with its non-commercial
scope are effectively foredosed. 176 But
a close reading of the statute reveals
that it covers any persons "engaged in
business." 177 And a person may be
"engaged in business" even if that
person does not make a profit or if the
Web site is not "the person's sole or
principal business or source of
income." 78 Vendors of pornography
are clearly covered under this
definition but it is not dear whether
other unsuspecting individuals and
businesses could also be liable.179 For
example, is a small business liable if it
allows free access to its potentially
objectionable site in order to boost
business? Is a business liable if it posts
public service information deemed
"harmful to minors"? 180
Assuming that COPA is limited to
commercial communications, the
statute forecloses its own effectiveness.
Minors may still gain access to harmful
materials through non-commercial
sites, foreign Web sites, and non-Web
protocols such as email, chat rooms,
and newsgroups. 81 According to
Senator Leahy, this might induce
Internet pornographers to perfect non-
Web based protocols in order to bypass
COPA. 82
COPA's effectiveness is also
undermined by the fact that a great
deal of harmful material originates
outside the United States and cannot
be reached by American laws.113 Even
so, it is undear whether COPA was
intended or actually does extend to
overseas Web sites. If so, it would
"raise difficult questions regarding
extraterritorial enforcement."184
C. Let technology "offer a solution to
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some of the problems that technology
itself creates"'
Even though the CDA law was
enacted for a legitimate and worthy
reason, the Court stressed that its
burden on adult speech was
"unacceptable if less restrictive
alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving [its goal]."""
Despite the existence of potentially less
restrictive alternatives, Congress failed
to make any detailed findings or hold
hearings regarding the matter. 87 As a
result, the Court was not persuaded
that the CDA was narrowly tailored.
According to Senator Leahy, Congress
repeated the same mistake with COPA
by allowing findings only by the bill's
sponsor and making only minimal
efforts to explore technically feasible
alternatives. 18 In fact, the House
Commerce Committee report briefly
discussed several market based
solutions before concluding they were
inadequate. 89
Judge Reed also noted that COPA
may not be the least restrictive means
to prevent minors from accessing
harmful material.' 9° He acknowledged
that filtering and blocking software
may be imperfect because it can fiter
out appropriate sites and allow
inappropriate sites. However, Judge
Reed also stated that such software
may be "at least as successful as
COPA" in restricting minor's access to
harmful material without also
burdening constitutionally protected
adult speech.19'
Ironically, COPA itself establishes a
"Commission on Online Child
Protection" to identify technology-
based alternatives. As Senator Leahy
stated, this "puts the proverbial cart-
before-the-horse."192 Certainly, when
restricting a potentially broad range of
speech, it makes sense to investigate
feasible alternatives before defining the
parameters of that speech. This would
allow Congress to actually solve the
problem rather than spending time and
resources to pass and defend an
ineffective law. This would also afford
the software industry time to address
the same concerns.
It may not be practical to expect
lawmakers to keep abreast of rapidly
evolving software technology but
industry, driven by demand and a
profit motive, will voluntarily do so.
Furthermore, the law may not be the
best way to solve these problems.'9
Laws can "breed a false sense of
security" and "lock us into the wrong
technology, technology that is obsolete
and will not do as good a job as
technology that might come along in
the future." 194
Private industry has already
developed measures to reduce
children's access to inappropriate
material. The most commonly raised
option is filtering and blocking
software, which has been available for
a number of years. Parents can install
the software on their home computers
or Internet Service Providers can also
install the software at their sites' 95
Once installed, the software prevents
certain sites from coming up on the
user's computer screen.
Software vendors employ people or
automated methods to determine what
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sites pass and what sites are blocked. 196
This use of subjective human judgment
can cause appropriate Web sites to be
blocked and inappropriate Web sites to
be accessible."9 For example, a search
on the word "animal" will raise a chat
room for people with a passion for
inflatable plastic pets.198 One product
even blocked all sites referencing actor
Dick Van Dyke and also blocked a page
showing a photograph of the Clintons
and Gores because it contained the
word "couple".99 But technology has
advanced significantly and, even the
Commerce Committee admits, at least
one product is available that analyzes a
resource based on its content.2°°
Furthermore, filtering and blocking
software can block out harmful
material not under COPA's protective
umbrella - international sites and non-
Web-based materials.201 The software
can also block out those tantalizing
little teasers offered for free by online
pornographers.
COPA's backers miss the point
when they fret that mandated use of
such software would be tantamount to
private censorship.2°2 Congress should
not mandate its use at all. Parents
should decide for themselves whether
to employ filtering and blocking
software to curtail their child's Web
access. With the knowledge that such
software is imperfect, parents can opt
to block out potentially appropriate
materials or simply allow access to
everything. Furthermore, as blocking
technology becomes more
sophisticated, the risk of blocking
acceptable material will diminish.
Representative Bliley eschews
market-based solutions in favor of
COPA on the grounds that "the law
should impose duties on the source of
the problem, not the victims."2 3 But
premature and overreaching laws turn
those we are trying to protect into
victims.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the difficult constitutional issues
in regulating the Internet, it would be
wise to apply Justice Souter's wait and
see approach 2°4 to the legislative
process. The Internet is in constant
flux and its technological capabilities
expand by day. As a result, "[i]f we
decide today. . . just what the First
Amendment should mean in
cyberspace,... we would get it
fundamentally wrong."205 Certainly
protecting the nation's children is a
laudable goal. Perhaps, however, "we
do the minors of this country harm if
First Amendment protections, which
they will with age inherit fully, are
chipped away in the name of their
protection."206
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